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  The EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft is undergoing a major weapon 
system improvement referred to as Improved Capabilities Three (ICAP III).  The ICAP 
III upgrade presents an opportunity to improve the existing aircraft system for alerting the 
crew of potential weapon system problems.   
This thesis provides a recommended design for display of weapon-system alerts 
in production Lot 1 configured EA-6B ICAP III aircraft.  Human factors engineering 
methods, the ICAP III system performance specification and the author’s experience 
employing electronic warfare weapon systems were used to define required alerts.  These 
tools along with human factors engineering research and software best practice research 
were used by the author to recommend consolidation, format, prioritization, location and 
mode of alert presentation.  Conclusions will be presented to the EA-6B ICAP III and 




A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained from Department 
of Defense test reports, FAA documents, and product literature on the design features of 
avionics systems from the Northrop Grumman Corporation.  The research, discussion, 
and conclusions presented are the opinion of the author and should not be construed as an 
official position or an endorsement of these products by the United States Naval service, 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
The EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft first saw Navy service in 1971 and was 
referred to as the Standard version.  In 1973 the Standard was upgraded to the Extended 
Capabilities version or EXCAP.  In 1976 the EA-6B was further upgraded to the 
Improved Capabilities or ICAP configuration.  In 1985 ICAP was followed by the more 
sophisticated Improved Capabilities Two version dubbed ICAP II.  The ICAP II version 
of the EA-6B saw action in Desert Storm, Kosovo and Iraqi Freedom and is the version 
of the aircraft currently fielded.  Most of these upgrades included changes to both the 
aircraft and weapon systems.  There are currently two “Blocks” of ICAP II configured 
EA-6B aircraft referred to as Block 89 and Block 89A.  Block 89A is an avionics upgrade 
to Block 89 fielded in 1993.  Block 89A did not include any upgrades to the tactical 
jamming or receiving (AN/ALQ-99) system.   
 In 1998 a contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and 
manufacturing development of the EA-6B Improved Capabilities Three (ICAP III) 
upgrade to the EA-6B aircraft.  The ICAP III modification only includes changes to the 
weapon system, not to the basic aircraft or non-weapon system avionics.  In order to 
reduce program risk and shorten the acquisition timeline a decision was made to retain 
much of the ICAP II functionality.   Germane to this thesis was the decision to retain the 
“Zone” structure of the ICAP II display interface (discussed in detail at the end of this 
chapter).   
EA-6B aircraft avionics (with the exception of the weapons system) have changed 
little since the aircraft was introduced over 30 years ago.  The first significant avionics 
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upgrade was Block 89A which added a first generation glass cockpit characterized by an 
electronic flight information system (EFIS) and flight management system (FMS) but did 
not address the system of aircraft alerts.  The aircraft alert system is better described as 
the “classic” cockpit which is characterized by a simple caution and warning system that 
covers only the most critical system failures (Arbuckle, Abbott, & Schutte, 1998).  There 
is virtually no integration between weapon system and aircraft alerts. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT 
The EA-6B aircraft is a four-place, twin-engine, mid-wing monoplane 
manufactured by the Grumman Aerospace Corporation (now Northrop Grumman), 
Bethpage, Long Island, New York.  The aircraft, designed for carrier and advanced base 
operation, is a modification of the basic two-place A-6 airframe.  The aircraft is an 
integrated electronic warfare weapon system that combines long-range, night vision and 
all weather capabilities with an advanced electronic countermeasures system.  A forward 
equipment bay and a pod shaped fairing on the vertical fin house the additional avionics 
equipment.  The side-by-side cockpit arrangement is designed for maximum efficiency, 
visibility, and comfort.  The aircraft is characterized by a large nose radome and swept 
back wings (EA-6B NATOPS).  
The aircraft is separated into two cockpits, forward and aft.  Each cockpit seats 
two crewmembers.  The front cockpit accommodates the pilot and an electronic 
countermeasures officer (ECMO).  Aircrew in the forward cockpit have historically been 
responsible for flying the aircraft, navigation, communications, and communications 
countermeasures.  The aft cockpit seats two ECMOs who have historically been 
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responsible for electronic surveillance and electronic attack.  This historical division-of-
labor developed because the ICAP II version of the aircraft only has controls and displays 
for the ALQ-99 receiver and jamming system in the aft cockpit.  The ICAP III version of 
the EA-6B adds controls and displays to both cockpits (discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter).   
   
MISSION OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT 
The mission of the EA-6B aircraft is to provide electronic warfare support for 
joint and coalition forces.  Electronic warfare support includes electronic attack, and 
electronic support.  In the case of the EA-6B, “electronic attack” refers to radar and 
communications jamming and employment of High-speed Anti Radiation Missiles 
(HARM).  Electronic support refers to collection, recording and dissemination of 
electronic signals of interest.  The EA-6B performs these mission areas in several mission 
scenarios which include Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), offensive counter 
air, deep strike, war at sea, electronic warfare in support of close air support, surface 
search coordination, force protection of the battle group, and intelligence preparation of 
the battle field. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ICAP III EA-6B AIRCRAFT 
The EA-6B ICAP III aircraft is a weapon system upgrade from the ICAP II 
version of the EA-6B aircraft.  The ICAP III upgrade consists of a “kit” which is used to 
modify an existing ICAP II Block 89A EA-6B aircraft.  Figure 1 depicts the ICAP III 
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  Figure 1.  ICAP III SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM (EA-6B NATOPS). 
 
The aircraft is modified to the ICAP III configuration by: 
1. Removal of the ICAP II receiver system and installation of the 
AN/ALQ-218 receiver system along with associated upgrades to 
the processing equipment.   
2. Removal of the ICAP II Digital Display Indicators, the APS-130 
radar Pilot’s Horizontal Display (PHD) and ECMO 1 Direct View 
Radar Indicator (DVRI), and installation of color displays at each 
crew station.  The new color displays along with the associated 
interface equipment are referred to as the Tactical Display System 
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(TDS).  The APS-130 radar display is presented on the new color 
displays at each crew station. 
3. Removal of the current data loader/recorder and installation of the 
Mission Reprogramming Unit (MRU), also known as the Data 
Storage Memory Unit (DSMU).   
4. Integration of the USQ-113 V(3) Radio Countermeasures Set 
(RCS) into the display and control system.   
5. Integration of the Improved Data Modem (IDM) into the display 
and control system.   
6. Integration of the Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal 
(MATT) into the display and control system.   
7. Provisions (wiring, installation, space, power, and cooling) for the 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS).   
8. Relocation of the ARA-63 Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
antenna by less than two inches. 
9. Removal of the Interface Control Unit (ICU).  The functions 
previously performed by the ICU will be performed by a portion of 
the AN/ALQ-218 tactical jamming system receiver (TJSR). (EA-
6B NATOPS) 
 
In addition to the changes mentioned above, several Weapon Replaceable 
Assemblies (WRAs) have been removed and their functions replaced within components 
5 
of the systems listed above.  The removed WRAs include the A/D converter, junction box 
A, forward and aft power supplies, and the computer interface unit/encoder CIU/E.  
From the crew interface perspective the largest change between the ICAP II and 
ICAP III systems is the addition of controls and displays for the ALQ-218 tactical 
jamming system receiver (TJSR) and ALQ-99 jammers to the forward cockpit.  All four 
ICAP III displays are color liquid crystal displays (LCDs). ICAP III has a display located 
at each crew station in the front and aft cockpits.  By comparison the two ICAP II 
displays are monochrome green cathode ray tubes (CRT) located at the crew stations in 
the aft cockpit only.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF EA-6B DISPLAY FORMATS 
The ICAP III displays are formatted in “Zones” which serve to separate the larger display 
area into discrete regions by general function.  The Zones are depicted in Figure 2 below. 
While there are no hard rules for functions or information contained in the Zones, some 
generalizations do apply.  Zone 1 is primarily software buttons that change the display or 
activate other functions.  Zone 2 is display of frequency bands or target track information.  
Zone 3 is the display of primary information.  Zone 4 is display of ALQ-99 jammer pod 
information.  Zone 5 is display of secondary information and where text or numerical 
values are entered.  Zone 6 is for display of textural alerts, aircraft position information, 
and other ancillary information.  The bottom left corner of Zone 6 is the primary location 
for weapon-system text alerts.  Some form of alert information is presented in every zone 














Figure 2.  ICAP III DISPLAY ZONES (EA-6B NATOPS). 
 
CURRENT ICAP III DISPLAY COLOR CONVENTION 
The current ICAP III color convention uses display color to differentiate detected 
emitter function.  Detected emitters are displayed in red, yellow or green based on the 
relative threat of the function they perform.  For example, engagement radars such as 
missile guidance or target illumination radars would be displayed in red.  Target 
acquisition radars would be displayed in yellow, and long-range search or height finding 
radars would be displayed in green. 
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CHAPTER 2:  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
DEFINITION OF ALERT 
For the purposes of this thesis “alert” will be defined as the attempt to notify the 
crew of a condition requiring their attention and possible intervention.  It naturally 
follows that conditions requiring alert will be those conditions, which if unrecognized by 
the crew, could have a negative impact on the safety or success of the mission. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS REQUIRING ALERT  
 AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS 
To aid further discussion, aircraft-system alerts will be differentiated from 
weapon-system alerts.  Simply put, aircraft-system alerts will refer to those alerts which 
do not involve the weapon system.  Examples of such alerts include the fire lights panel, 
caution lights panel, and forward-cockpit ladder lights panel.  These alert locations 
indicate fire, failure of critical systems such as hydraulics or generators, low fuel or oil 
quantity, or fuel pressure problems.  They also indicate condition of systems.  The ladder 
light panel for example indicates the status of the automatic carrier landing system. 
Thirty years of iterative design have provided the current aircraft-system alert 
design.  Over time alerts have been added in response to lessons learned from operational 
use.  Because the ICAP III upgrade only changes the weapon system and does not include 
any changes to the basic aircraft systems there is no need (or opportunity) to modify the 
existing aircraft-system alerts.  It is important however, to understand the basic aircraft-
system alerts because the weapon-system alerts generated by ICAP III (and the focus of 
this thesis) must make sense in the context of the overall aircraft alert scheme.  
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 WEAPON-SYSTEM ALERTS 
Within the ICAP III weapon system there are many conditions which require crew 
attention.  Many of these conditions are carried-over from the ICAP II system although 
the complexity of the AN/ALQ-218 has increased the number of alerts required.  
Examples of conditions requiring alert include jammer failure, other system failures, 
changes in jammer status not involving failures, failure to execute crew instructions due 
to error checking, or any other state requiring crew attention. 
 
 CURRENT ALERTS 
  AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS 
 Aircraft-system visually displayed alerts are presented in the forward cockpit 
only.  Warnings are displayed as red lights and consist of the fire and wheels warning 
lights.  Aircraft-system cautions are centered around a caution lights panel with 
individual lights for various aircraft systems.  These lights advise of aircraft system 
malfunctions or indicate a particular condition of the applicable system (EA-6B 
NATOPS).  Caution lights are yellow.  There are also “master caution” lights on the 
upper instrument panel on both sides of the front cockpit.  The master caution lights flash 
whenever one of the lights on the caution lights panel is illuminated.  The master caution 
lights can be extinguished once recognized by the crew, but the light on the caution lights 
panel will remain on until the condition is corrected.  Advisory lights are presented on the 
“ladder lights panel” and provide advisory information on the status of the automatic 
carrier landing system.  The advisory lights on the ladder lights panel are green.  Figure 3 














































Figure 3.  ICAP III FRONT COCKPIT ALERT DISPLAY LOCATIONS  
(ICAP III Weapon System Operator’s Manual, 2003). 
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The only auditory alert displays are a low altitude warning tone (when the aircraft 
descends below the altitude set on the radar altimeter) and a stall warning horn (when 
angle of attack exceeds 21 units).  Auditory warnings are displayed to all four crew 
positions.   
 
  WEAPON-SYSTEM ALERTS 
All current ICAP III alerts are shown in Appendix A.  The alerts are currently 
grouped by the display-zone in which they are displayed.  They are further 
subcategorized by hardware or mission-area affected (listed as “function” in the 
appendix).  Other than limited color-coding, no effort has been made to group alerts by 
severity (advisory, caution or warning).   
The original design only incorporated Zone 6 text alerts and Zone 4 jammer 
alerts.  Throughout the test-analyze-fix development process other alerts were added to 
Zones 1 and 6.  These additions were to address initial omissions or to provide enhanced 
visibility into system health.  Because of the tight schedule, little human factors analysis, 
prototyping or design iteration was completed as these alerts were added.   
Because the alerts list in Appendix A is largely a carry-over from ICAP II, with 
additions for the AN/ALQ-218 system, it is very comprehensive for a new weapon 
system.  Opportunity for both consolidation and reduction exists since the list has only 
been through one iteration since it was originally generated.  The greater number of 





 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The aircraft system and its related alerts are more mature than the weapon-system 
alert scheme.  There is also no opportunity to change the existing aircraft system alerts 
because the ICAP III upgrade only affects the weapon system, not the basic aircraft 
systems.  Discussion of the existing aircraft-system alerts is germane since they form the 
background context in which the weapon-system alerts must be interpreted (both from a 
design perspective and as encoded by the crew).  In human factors terms, alerts presented 
anywhere in the aircraft (aircraft or weapon system related) should be consistent and 
compatible.  Since the aircraft-system alerts are not likely to change they become a 
driving factor for the weapon-system alert design. 
The primary challenge addressed by this work will be improvements to the 
weapon-system alert displays to correct potential deficiencies identified during 
developmental testing of the ICAP III aircraft.  The weapon-system alerts described in 
the previous paragraphs are not prioritized relative to each other.  Resulting in the last 
alert generated being displayed on top of previous alerts regardless of severity.  There is 
no differentiation between severity of alerts by display location or display mode.  Alerts 
are presented in different locations of the display.  Some alerts, which are advisory in 
nature, are displayed at the top level while more critical alerts require several button 
actuations to view.  Color is not always used to display alert severity consistent with 
sound human factors engineering practices or the ICAP III color convention.  Finally, 
there has been little consideration given to integrating aircraft and weapon-system alerts. 
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CHAPTER 3:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
ICAP III SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION 
The Electronics Performance Requirements For EA-6B ICAP III Aircraft Systems 
Performance Specification (SPS) dated 14 August 2003, under the heading of SPS-2131 
states the requirements quite simply as, “(U) Operator alerts”.  This obviously gives wide 
latitude to satisfy the requirement. 
 
F/A-18 DOCUMENTS 
The F/A-18E/F aircraft provides four levels of cuing for the purpose of alerting 
the crew to critical aircraft status situations.  These are defined as follows from lowest to 
highest priority:  advisories, cautions with master caution tone and master caution light, 
cautions with voice alert and master caution light, warnings with voice alert (H2E System 
Configuration Set, 2003).  The F/A-18E/F alert strategy would be described as a “first 
generation” glass cockpit.  The primary characteristic of a first generation glass cockpit 
alert system is a “strict hierarchy of warnings (immediate crew action required), cautions 
(immediate crew awareness and future action required) and advisories (crew awareness 
and possible action required)” (Arbuckle, Abbott & Schutte, 1998). 
 
WARNINGS 
Warnings indicate system malfunctions requiring immediate action.  The F/A-
18E/F convention is to display warnings as red warning lights with voice alert (F/A-




Cautions indicate malfunctions requiring attention but not immediate action.  The 
F/A-18E/F convention is to display cautions in larger characters than the advisory 
displays and immediately above the advisory displays (F/A-18E/F NATOPS).  For 
certain critical aircraft functions, voice alerting is provided to enhance the level of 
aircrew cuing.  For cautions in this category, a voice alert message is provided in lieu of 
the Master Caution tone (H2E System Configuration Set, 2003).  Caution lights are 
yellow in the F/A-18 aircraft. 
 
  ADVISORIES 
Advisories indicate safe or normal conditions and supply information for routine 
purposes.  The F/A-18E/F convention is to display advisories at the bottom of the display 
preceded by “ADV”.  Advisory lights are green in the F/A-18 aircraft (F/A-18E/F 
NATOPS).   
 
 FAA DOCUMENTS 
 Because of the proliferation of complex integrated avionics the FAA has issued 
guidance to “facilitate the identification and resolution of human factors/pilot interface 
issues” (FAA N8110.98, 2002).  One of the areas covered is warnings, cautions and 
advisories of such systems.  Even though military aircraft are not generally subject to 
FAA certification, there are valuable lessons to be learned from civil experience and 
guidance.   
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 The FAA addresses four primary areas.  The first area addressed is determination 
of which system generated the alert.  This is particularly important as the complexity of 
modern systems increases.  This is addressed in Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A which 
requires “systems, controls and associated monitoring and warning means must be 
designed to minimize crew errors”.  To this end warning, caution and advisory messages 
should be clear, concise and easily interpreted (FAA N8110.98, 2002).  The second area 
discusses the limited space available on modern displays and the need to prioritize which 
alerts occupy the limited space when multiple alerts are generated by the system.  The 
third area discussed is use of color.  FAA advice with respect to color states, “a warning 
should be generated when immediate recognition and corrective or compensatory action 
is required; the associated color is red.  A caution should be generated when immediate 
crew awareness and subsequent crew action is required and subsequent crew action will 
be required, the associated color is amber/yellow” (Advisory Circular (AC) 25-11).  The 
final area addressed is differentiation.  The FAA advises alert messages should be 
differentiated from normal indications.  Specifically, “ abnormal indications should use 
techniques like shape, size, color, flashing, boxing, outlining, etc. to make them stand out 
from normal indications” (Advisory Circular (AC) 23.2311-1A).    
 
 HOFFER THESIS 
In his thesis titled “Implementing operator-centric cockpit design in the EA-6B 
ICAP III aircraft” Thomas Hoffer identified a subset of the problem addressed by this 
work.  He wrote, " critical weapons system failure alerts can go unnoticed by the 
ECMOs."  He further defined the critical alerts as, “power degrades to an unacceptable 
15 
level on any jammer transmitter, antenna steering of a jammer transmitter varies by more 
than 5 degrees from the commanded steering, electrical power from the pod RAT is 
interrupted, or antenna beam width limitations are exceeded.”  The identified failures 
were only deemed critical when the MASTER RADIATE switch was in the RADIATE 
position, allowing the jammers to transmit.  He went on to recommend these alerts be 
presented to the crew by “a voice warning system using synthesized speech technology to 
present a non-gender, distinctive, mature voice that will present the messages in a formal 
and impersonal manner”.  His research suggested a message consisting of a “0.5 second 
non-voice aural alerting tone followed by a voice message consisting of three to four 
syllables with a duration of not less than 1 second or more than 3 seconds” would be the 
optimal format.  His design recommendations were based on EA-6B Block 89A 
configuration with the AN/AIC-14A analog Inter-cockpit Communications System (ICS).  
The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the ICAP III aircraft will be Lot I configuration 
with the AN/AIC-45 digital ICS which has an enhanced ability to generate the types of 
auditory displays recommended (Hoffer, 2000).   
 
HUMAN FACTORS TEXTS 
  HUMAN FACTORS IN THE S/W DESIGN PROCESS 
The primary human factors consideration in software design is the interface.  The 
interface is also one of the last functional stages of design (Meister & Enderwick, 2002) 
and often occurs (at least in part) during the test phase.  This is largely due to the 
dependant and iterative nature of interface design.   
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The importance of this iterative cycle has been described as, “a critical component 
of the user testing and prototyping development cycle” (C. Marlin Brown, 1998).  It’s 
important to note the design presented by this thesis will not be the final stage of this 
iteration.  “Problems discovered in a test cycle must be addressed in a revised design (the 
purpose of this work) then the revised design must be tested.  Otherwise, there is no 
guarantee that the revised design is better than the original” (Brown, 1998).  Prototyping 
and usability testing of a proposed design is beyond the scope of this work.  However, 
“the effect of redesigns can be enhanced if, as criteria, they are buttressed by quantitative 
design relevant human factors research” (Meister & Enderwick, 2002).  This chapter 
clearly seeks to provide such buttressing.     
 
 DESIGN GUIDELINES 
  Display 
The term display can be used to describe almost any indirect form of presenting 
information.  Examples include visual, auditory, tactile and olfactory, often referred to as 
display modalities (Sanders & McCormick, 1993).   
 
   Display Format 
For our purposes “format” will be used to describe where information is 
displayed.  This is in contrast to “method” (discussed next) which will be used to describe 
how information is displayed.  An important principal when discussing display format is 
the principal of consistency.  Consistency refers to maintaining the same style of 
interaction throughout operations (Meister & Enderwick, 2002).  For visual displays there 
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are several methods available to help achieve consistency.  These include reserved 
display areas which use fixed display locations or screen areas for the same information.  
These can be broken down into two types, invariant fields and functional category fields 
(Brown, 1988).  An invariant field stays the same on every screen or page (Engel & 
Granda, 1997).  A functional category field is reserved for certain types of data (Engel & 
Granda, 1997).  Another important factor is “data order” which refers to arranging items 
in some recognizable or useful order.  The data order strategy of “Importance grouping” 
makes the most sense for alert displays.  Importance grouping refers to the arrangement 
of the most significant information, or that requiring immediate response, at the top of a 
list (Brown, 1988). 
 
   Display Method 
As previously stated, “method” will be used to describe how information is 
displayed.  Because the ICAP III aircraft has no capability to generate tactile or olfactory 
displays only visual and auditory display methods will be discussed.  Within the visual 
and auditory categories, only display methods available consistent with operation aboard 
tactical aircraft will be discussed.  In general this means displays which can be generated 
by cathode ray tube (CRT) or liquid crystal display (LCD) type technologies, or digital 
inter cockpit communications (ICS) systems.  
 
   Visual Display Methods 
Many techniques are available to differentiate alerts from other information 
presented on the visual displays.  The presence or absence of a display window or field 
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may be used to indicate the presence or absence of any type of alert.  For example if the 
alert window is displayed there is an alert present.  If the window is absent there are no 
alerts.   
Within the alert window various strategies may be employed to help quickly 
determine the relative severity of alerts.  These include color, text size, text font and text 
effects like blinking, highlighting, and reverse video.  These techniques can be employed 
separately or used in combination.  Caution must be exercised to avoid over use of 
attention getting techniques to avoid visual discomfort.  This is especially true for 
blinking and highlighting (Brown, 1988). 
 
   Auditory Display Methods 
“In selecting or designing displays for transmission of information in some 
situations, the selection of the sensory modality is virtually a forgone conclusion.  
Specifically, the unique features of the auditory system make auditory displays especially 
useful for warnings and alarms”  (Sanders & McCormick, 1993).  This isn’t to say 
auditory alerts should be used without regard to the system in which they will be 
integrated.  In particular, the following rules-of-thumb apply to presentation of auditory 
displays:  “avoid extremes of auditory dimensions; establish intensity relative to ambient 
noise level; use interrupted or variable signals; do not overload the auditory channel” 
(Sanders & McCormick, 1993).  These rules are particularly important in an EA-6B 
cockpit where the crew’s auditory channel is heavily loaded listening to three radios and 
four crewmembers on the ICS. 
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 WEB PAGE USABILITY 
The ICAP III displays are modified commercial hardware with interface designs 
based on (and limited by) a commercial software architecture.  Multiple pages (breadth) 
and layers (depth) of information are also displayed.  This format is similar to 
commercial web site design where related pages of information are linked together and 
must be navigated.  As such the design challenges for the ICAP III displays are similar to 
commercial web page design.  It follows that factors important to effective design of web 
sites should be useful in optimizing the ICAP III interface.  The following information 
was taken from the web site http://www.humanfactors.com.   
One conclusion drawn from studies of web page navigation is 
that color similarity has a stronger perceptual influence than common 
region, proximity, or grouping (Beck and Palmer, 2002).  A similar but 
more generalized conclusion was that effective sub-grouping reduces 
perceived breadth and grouping navigation elements by theme 
improves performance for even the broadest structures.  Creating clear 
and distinct labels for navigation elements enhances performance.  
Lastly, users only perceive / encode (change in) elements of the 
display that they are directly focused on (Simon & Chabris, 1999). 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
This work seeks to utilize a design approach described as, “Hill climbing from a 
predecessor artifact.”  This is defined as, ”Design decisions motivated by an analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of an existing system in terms of functionality, interface 
techniques, or tasks implied by these.  A perceived problem may be fixed or a new 
feature added” (Meister & Enderwick, 2002).  Tools to complete this analysis include the 
authors experience in more than 150 hours of ICAP III flight test and interviews with 
other experienced aircrew to define the conditions requiring alert.  Once defined, the 
same methodology was used to separate alerts by severity into the categories of warnings, 
cautions and advisories as defined earlier.  Finally, a review of military standards, F/A-18 
design standards, FAA documents, a related thesis by Thomas Hoffer, human factors 
texts, web page usability texts and the author’s extensive experience in EA-6B ICAP III 
and F/A-18G design was used to make recommendations for design improvement of the 
ICAP III alert system. 
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 CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Like many modern weapon-system interfaces, the ICAP III crew vehicle interface 
is a complex, software controlled fusion of a tremendous amount of information.  
Containing a great amount of information both on the primary display pages (breadth) 
and nearly an equal amount of information available by selecting sub-displays (depth).  
As such the display interface has usability challenges similar to an internet web page.  
The tools available to meet these challenges are also similar because the ICAP III display 
hardware, and much of the underlying software, are commercial-off-the-shelf and 
therefore similar to that used in commercial internet applications. 
 
INTEGRATION 
This modern, commercial-based interface must also be integrated into the reality 
of the existing EA-6B cockpit.  Weapon-system alerts have to make sense in relation to 
the existing aircraft-system alerts.  For example, it doesn’t make sense to have weapon 
system related warnings, sounding sirens and flashing lights, while the existing engine 
fire indication is simply a steady red light.  While minor modifications to the existing 
aircraft alert scheme may be possible, to help harmonize weapon-system and aircraft-
system alerts, changes to existing aircraft-system alerts will not be addressed in this 
work.  
Prior to the ICAP III upgrade, weapon-system alerts were only presented to the aft 
cockpit crew, and aircraft system alerts (except for auditory warnings) were only 
presented to the front cockpit crew.  With the introduction of weapon-system controls and 
displays to the front cockpit, as part of the ICAP III upgrade, this separate cockpit 
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scheme for alert management is no longer necessary; which doesn’t necessarily mean it’s 
no longer desirable.     
 
PRIORITIZATION 
ICAP III alerts need to be prioritized and the prioritization scheme needs to make 
sense in the context of the existing aircraft-system alerts.  Warnings should be displayed 
ahead of cautions, which should be displayed ahead of advisories.  Within categories 
(warning, caution or advisory) alerts should be displayed in the order generated.  For 
example when three advisories are generated, the last one generated should be displayed 
in higher precedence than the first, but after all the cautions or warnings.  Warnings and 
cautions should provide sufficient information at the top level to inform the crew what 
condition exists and what corrective action is necessary.  Advisories should provide 
sufficient information at the top level to inform the crew what system is affected and 
where to look for amplifying information if required.  
 
CONSOLIDATION 
 Because the ICAP III upgrade added more alerts in addition to previously 
existing ICAP II alerts, and the display interface is only beginning the iterative design 
process, there is still a need for alert consolidation.  Consolidating alerts adds display 
complexity.  In order to get the detail required from a consolidated alert there must be a 
method to expand for more detail.  This expansion could be on the same page creating 
greater breadth, or on a different page creating more depth.  This would force the crew to 
“navigate” the display to find the detail needed.   
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By definition warnings and cautions direct action.  Therefore, they need to be 
fairly explicit.  This means there is less opportunity for consolidation of warning or 
caution messages because having the crew search for amplifying information is not 
desirable when action is required.  Unlike warnings and cautions, advisories by definition 
do not require timely action.  In the case of advisories it is desirable to consolidate 
display at the top level, provided the consolidated alerts are sufficient to direct the crew 
to a source of amplifying information.  Consolidation reduces clutter on the primary 
display, helps suppress multiple advisories from the same system and reduces crew 
distraction. 
 
USE OF COLOR 
It is clear from almost every source that color is a powerful discriminator.  It is 
also apparent, from FAA regulations and various human factors texts sited earlier, that a 
powerful learned association exists linking red with danger, yellow with caution and 
green with normal operations.  Both F/A-18 and EA-6B designs use this association when 
presenting aircraft-system warnings, cautions and advisories.  It is also apparent the 
existing ICAP III weapon-system alerts do not take advantage of this association. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion.  First, alert 
consolidation and display grouping is required.  The effects on display navigation 
complexity must be assessed.  Visual and auditory alert presentation must be integrated 
into the existing aircraft-system and ICAP III weapon-system architecture.  The 
following paragraphs provide detailed discussion of these areas. 
 
 CONSOLIDATION OF ALERTS 
Consolidation and clarification of alerts are needed to correct deficiencies 
identified during ICAP III developmental testing.  The existing ICAP III alert strategy 
has an abundance of poorly associated and overly detailed alerts (Appendix A).  The 
current alerts are also scattered over the entire display area as shown in Figure 4.  
Appendix B shows the proposed alerts grouped by severity (warnings, cautions and 
advisories) and the alerts recommended for removal.  Note that warnings and cautions 
have not been consolidated, but advisories have been consolidated where practical.  For 
example, the over fifty Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) alerts have 
been reduced to a single advisory displayed as “MATT”.  Figure 4 also shows the 
recommended location of the alert window described in detail below.   
 
DISPLAY NAVIGATION 
 The meaning of warnings and cautions is explicit at the top display level 
and no further navigation is required before taking corrective action.  Further detail for 
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Figure 4.  ICAP III CURRENT AND PROPOSED ALERT LOCATIONS. 




advisories may be obtained by selecting the existing Jammer Assignment Status (JAS) 
page for jammer advisories, or the existing Built In Test (BIT) page for all other 
advisories.  Therefore display navigation with the proposed alert design is actually 
simpler and more straightforward than the current design despite the consolidation of 
alerts and locations. 
 
VISUAL DISPLAY CONCLUSIONS 
 Alerts will be displayed in a dedicated window placed at the top center of Zone 3 
on the existing primary tactical display pages (Figure 4).  When no alerts are present the 
window will be stowed (not displayed).  Display on the primary tactical display pages is 
sufficient because each individual crewmember spends over 80% of their time on these 
pages, and between all members of the crew one of these pages is selected almost all the 
time.  Auditory display will ensure recognition in the unlikely event that no members of 
the crew have the primary tactical display pages selected.  Auditory display will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 The alert window will be of sufficient size to allow one 16 character alert to be 
displayed.  Warnings will be displayed over cautions which will be displayed over 
advisories.  Within categories the last alert generated will be displayed on top.  When 
more than one alert is present a drop-down arrow [▼] will be placed on the right side of 
the window indicating more information is available by expanding the window.  Placing 
the cursor on the drop-down arrow and pressing the SEL(select) key on the Aircraft 
Keyboard Pointing Device (AKPD), or placing the cursor in the alert window and 
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selecting the MENU button on the (AKPD) will “pull down” a larger window showing all 
active alerts (Figure 5).  This expanded displayed will present alerts in the same order 
discussed above.  This function is consistent with other ICAP III window functionality 
and is already supported by existing software and hardware.  Alerts will be displayed as 
black text, highlighted by the appropriate color for the severity of the alert.  Warnings 
will be highlighted red, cautions yellow and advisories green.  
 
 ICAP III ALERT INTEGRATION WITH AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS 
  Aircraft-system alerts potentially reflect danger to the safety of the aircraft.  





















Figure 5.  AIRBORNE KEYBOARD POINTING DEVICE 
(ICAP III Weapon System Operator’s Manual, 2003). 
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these two related yet distinct alert types on the same display may seem desirable at first 
glance.  However, having a physical distinction in display location (aircraft-system alerts 
displayed on dedicated light panels while weapon-system alerts are displayed on the 
TDS) serves to separate, define and solidify the potential impact.   
This isn’t to imply that integration is not needed.  A seemingly sensible but 
suboptimum solution would be reached if the weapon system were viewed apart from the 
context of integration in the EA-6B.  In fact, the EA-6B historic division-of-labor 
between the front and aft cockpit crews provides a simple and effective solution.  Even 
though the ICAP III modification makes some weapon-system controls and displays 
available to the front cockpit crew, the aft cockpit crew has most of the controls to correct 
weapon system related problems.   
 Current aircraft-system alerts are not selectable by the crew.  That is to say they 
are displayed whenever conditions warrant, cannot be deselected, and are of fixed volume 
(can not be turned down).  This scheme should continue to be followed for any additional 
auditory aircraft-system alerts added in the future.  On the other hand, weapon-system 
alerts would integrate more easily if they could be selected by the crew.  For example the 
aft crew could elect to hear weapon-system auditory alerts while the front cockpit crew 
chose not to.  Or all three ECMOs could elect to hear weapon-system alerts but the pilot 
could choose not to.  This would allow those members of the crew controlling the 
weapon system to have auditory cueing of system malfunction without interfering with 
the forward crew’s (or pilot’s) situational awareness of the aircraft-systems status.  This 
discussion only pertains to auditory alerts, as the visual alerts will be present on all four 
displays as discussed earlier.  
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 AUDITORY DISPLAY CONCLUSIONS 
 Whenever conditions exist to generate a weapon-system warning, an auditory 
display consisting of an interrupted beeping tone of 0.5 second duration (Hoffer, 2000) 
should be presented to any crew station with weapon-system tone selected on the ICS 
control panel.   The purpose of this tone is to alert the crew to the presence of a weapon-
system warning and direct their attention to the visual warning display or to the primary 
tactical displays if not already selected.  If a member of the crew did not have one of the 
primary tactical display pages selected, those pages could be reached by a single button 
actuation.  The auditory warning would only be displayed once for each occurrence of a 
persistent weapon-system warning.  Because timely action is not required, cautions and 
advisories would not have an associated auditory alert.  If a warning were corrected and 
then reoccurred the auditory warning would also reoccur.   
 Voice aural alerts are not recommended for weapon-system alerts for three 
reasons.  First, an interrupted tone is sufficient to alert the crew to the presence of a 
weapon-system warning, and the visual display can adequately present the needed detail.  
Second, voice aural alerts could saturate the crew’s auditory channel in a cockpit where 
three radios and four crewmembers could all be presenting voice information to the crew.  
Lastly, voice aural alerts are more appropriate for safety related aircraft-system alerts.  
Therefore an interrupted tone weapon-system auditory alert satisfies the requirement for 
weapon-system related warnings and makes sense in the existing, and possible future, 
aircraft-system alert schemes. 
30 
CHAPTER 7:  RECOMMENDATIONS  
 I recommend NAVAIR PMA-234 identify resources and contract for prototyping 
of the alert design proposed above.  Initial prototyping could be accomplished at the 
software support activity at Point Mugu, California.  Once a prototype has been created 
developmental testing should be performed to ensure correction of previously identified 
deficiencies.  Usability testing should be conducted to determine the level of 
improvement over the previous implementation.  If necessary another iteration should 
begin to further improve the design.   
 A study should be undertaken to determine the feasibility of integrating existing 
aircraft-system alerts with the AN/AIC-45 digital ICS.  Such integration would better 
align the EA-6B alert system with the existing “first generation” glass cockpit (Arbuckle, 
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CURRENT ICAP III ALERTS 
 
ZONE 1 ALERTS 
 
ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
BIT Label red CBIT failure is reported. BIT 
IDM Label red Own-ship receives an IDM off board Free Text or SEAD 
message. 
IDM 
JAS Label red Assignment Not Made (any reason) JAM MGMT 
MATT Label red Classified MATT OFP has been loaded, but MATT is 
determined to be not mission capable 
MATT 
Own-ship Latitude/Longitude white on red 
background 
No navigation data or invalid latitude/longitude. NAV 
PHASE Dropdown Label background 
yellow 
Phase Transition criteria has been met. PHASE 
MISSION 
PE RA white on blue background  RA Protected Entity Mode is enabled. SYS STAT 
TT RA white blue background  RA Target Tracks Mode is enabled. SYS STAT 
TUNE Indicator white on red background  No TJSR power, or no IM heartbeat. TJSR 
DET Indicator white on red background No TJSR power, or no IM heartbeat. TJSR 
TUNE Indicator white on black background TJSR power AND IM heartbeat. TJSR 
DET Indicator white on black background TJSR power AND IM heartbeat. TJSR 
TUNE L Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 did not complete an Aux Receiver dwell during the 
last LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
DET L Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 did not receive Low Band pulse data in Aux receiver 
during the last LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
TUNE H Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 did not complete a primary receiver dwell during the 
last LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
DET H Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 did not receive pulse data in primary receiver during 
the last LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
TUNE L Indicator black on green 
background  
LR-700 completed an Aux Receiver dwell during the last LR-
700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
DET L Indicator black on green 
background  
LR-700 received Low Band pulse data in Aux receiver during 
the last LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
TUNE H Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 completed a primary receiver dwell during the last 
LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
DET H Indicator white on black 
background  
LR-700 received pulse data in primary receiver during the last 
LR-700 Status cycle. 
TJSR 
TUNE L Indicator black on yellow 
background  




ZONE 4 ALERTS 
 
ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
Line 1 red background Line 2 red 
‘P’ 
Power loss.  XMTR power below threshold. JAM MGMT 
Line 1 yellow background Line 2 
yellow ‘S’ 
Steering Failure.  XMTR antenna feedback does not agree with commanded 
steering. JAM MGMT 
Line 1 red ‘!’ Pod mismatch.  Either a UE has been detected with a UEU JT Library loaded, 








JAMMER ASSIGNMENT STATUS (JAS) PAGE ALERTS 
 
JAS ALERT TEXT ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
INVJT Assignment Not Made – Invalid Jam Technique JAM MGMT 
NOJMR Assignment Not Made – No Available Jammer JAM MGMT 
   
LPRTY Assignment Not Made – Low Priority JAM MGMT 
FCOFF Assignment Not Made – FASTCOMM Off JAM MGMT 
CLRD Assignment Not Made – Assignment Cleared JAM MGMT 
STR Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Steering JAM MGMT 
PCOFF Assignment Not Made –PRIORITY CLEAR Off JAM MGMT 
NOCOM Assignment Not Made –No COM Mode Channel 
Available 
JAM MGMT 
NORDR Assignment Not Made – No Radar Mode Channel 
Available 
JAM MGMT 
INCJT Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Jam Technique JAM MGMT 
POL Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Polarization JAM MGMT 
MODEF Assignment Not Made –Mode Switch Failure JAM MGMT 
COMFL Assignment Not Made – Com Mode Failure JAM MGMT 
RDRFL Assignment Not Made – Radar Mode Failure JAM MGMT 
-* Assignment TSA-Modified JAM MGMT 
-F Assignment FASTCOMM JAM MGMT 
 
 
ZONE 6 ALERTS 
 
 TEXT ALERT  ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
REJECT PURGE IM rejects operator purge request. AEF MGMT 
TDSIU OVERTEMP  TDSIU temperature out of limits BIT 
TDSIU FAIL  TDSIU has failed BIT 
VDP-IM PROC FL  Information management processor has failed BIT 
MM PROC FAIL  Mission management processor has failed BIT 
MIO FAIL  Miscellaneous input/output fail  BIT 
TDSIU RSC FAIL  Radar scan converter fail BIT 
TDSIU POWER FL  TDSIU power fail BIT 
TDSIU HUB FAIL  TDSIU LAN hub fail BIT 
MAX LIST  At the time ASGN was depressed to transfer threat listings to 
the HCP, there existed more than the max allowed listings for 
the selected block missile. 
HARM 
POSS MSL EMI  MSL RDY condition with MSTR RAD on and a jammer 
assignment in band 
HARM 
CANT ADD LIST No match found between AEF parameter and threat listings 
for current HARM code. 
HARM 
INV HARM PRI One or more PRIs in Hand-Off-Word Is out of range for the 
selected Block missile. 
HARM 
INCOMP MSLBLK Operator attempted to assign a target packet with a missile 
block ID that is incompatible with the HCP selected missile. 
HARM 
LSTNG SHORTD More than 15 listings, compatible with the selected missile 
block, were available at the time of assignment to the HCP. 
HARM 
NO MSL RDY   Attempt to turn on ABL mode with no MSL RDY condition. HARM 
AVOID LAUNCH  Missile selected with Seeker and/or Control Section BIT 
failure(s). 
HARM 
RU BSITEONLY Missile selected with Baro Sensor BIT failure. HARM 
MSTER RAD ON Attempt to turn on ABL with active high band jamming or 
activating jamming while ABL is on. 
HARM 
CNT MTCH FRQ Attempt to turn on ABL when no listing includes Pre-Launch 
Frequency. 
HARM 




ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED) 
 
TEXT ALERT  ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
CHK MSL BLK  The Glide and/or Geo Spec settings that would be 
displayed in Zone 5 TGTRNG are not compatible with 
the HCP selected missile that has just had a target 
packet assigned. 
HARM 
INAP HARM DA TJSR or operator designated best fit has changed 
classification of an AEF for which a HARM target packet 
has been created. 
HARM 
IDM MSG RCV ER An error was detected when the CMC attempted to 
receive a message from IDM. 
IDM 
ILLEGAL FREQ  Operator attempts a jammer assignment to Band 1, 2, or 
extended Band 7 that are not covered by the respective 
transmitter or the frequency is outside the UEU 
frequency limits. 
JAM MGMT 
CANT ASG XX Operator attempts a jammer assignment and a 1553 
data bus transmission error to station XX is detected for 
3 successive data transmissions. 
JAM MGMT 
CANT CLR XX Operator attempts to clear a jammer assignment to 
station XX and a 1553 data bus transmission error is 
detected for three successive data transmissions. 
JAM MGMT 
POD INTRPT X Exciter on pod station X has indicated a primary power 
interruption that results in loss of all jammer 
assignments in both stations of that exciter. 
JAM MGMT 
JMRS ASGD XX Operator performs a Clear Files, CMC IPL or library load 
when jammer assignments exist on station XX. 
JAM MGMT 
POD MISMATCH Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out. JAM MGMT 
PRESS REVAL The operator attempts to change a FWS priority within 
the current mission phase or change a target track 
priority within the current mission phase or designate a 
target track PHASE PA eligible or ineligible within the 
current mission phase or load a library that has one or 
more PHASE PA eligible target tracks in mission phase 
one. 
JAM MGMT 
ASGN IN PROG A low band adjustment is in progress. JAM MGMT 
NO NEW JAM RQMT Jamming Assignment that will use MNB Jam Strategy 
but all of the beams are already covered by existing 
jamming assignment. 
JAM MGMT 
CANNOT REASSIGN System cannot do a jammer reassign. JAM MGMT 
INVAL JAM TECH Operator request DA with invalid jam technique. JAM MGMT 
TRACKER UNAVAL CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers 
available. 
JAM MGMT 
TTRK NOT IN USE Operator attempts a jamming assignment to a Target 
Track that is not in-use, i.e., does not exist. 
JAM MGMT 
BND SWTCH FAULT Operator attempts to switch band of a band-switchable 
XMTR, and status is reported back as not switched. 
JAM MGMT 
NO ASGN BFR FUL Jam assignment request results in a not-made, and 
there is no room in the not-made buffer. 
JAM MGMT 
CM PR CL ASG The system clears jamming assignment(s) for any of 
several reasons. 
JAM MGMT 
INAP JAMMING Operator designates a new best fit for an AEF that has 
current active AA jamming requirement. JAM MGMT 
JAM ASGN Operator attempts to purge a target track that has 
jamming assignment. JAM MGMT 
NON EXISTNT CTF Operator attempts a jamming assignment against a CTF 
that MM does not have. 
JAM MGMT 
NON EXISTNT AEF Operator attempts a jamming assignment against an 
AEF that MM does not have. 
JAM MGMT 
JMR BW LIMIT System determines that two or more jamming 
assignments on the same transmitter are no longer 
covered by the transmitter antenna beam width. 
JAM MGMT 
MATT CTF 80 PCT MATT CTF is 80% full MATT 
MATT CTF 90 PCT MATT CTF is 90% full MATT 
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ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED) 
 
TEXT ALERT  ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
MATT CTF FULL MATT CTF is full MATT 
M-ILO USER ID MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO STATE MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO FORMAT MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO RPM MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO PG LEN MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO DTG MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ILO TRAF TYPE MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ISM LOGD ON MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-on/Log-off Request MATT 
M-ISM RMT ONOFF MATT rejects an SP Manager Remote Log-on/Log-off request MATT 
M-ISM LOG OFF MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-off Request MATT 
M-ISM RMT FLTR MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request MATT 
M-ISM RMT BYPSS MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request MATT 
M-ISM RMT TAB MATT rejects Tabular Print Fields Request MATT 
M-ISM STATE MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-on/Log-off Request MATT 
M-GLF NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF NOT SPMGR MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF FILE IND MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF NUM EXCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF FIELD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF REC NAME MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF USER ID MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-GLF IN USE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CIS IN USE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-USP IN USE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP IN USE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF IN USE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 




ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED) 
 
TEXT ALERT  ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
M-CIS NOTATION MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-FRP OWNPOS MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-CCF ACTIVE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF ACTIVE MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-LDF REFRENCD MATT rejects File Record Request MATT 
M-IMR RPT TYPE MATT rejects MATT Report Request MATT 
M-IMR USER ID MATT rejects MATT Report Request MATT 
M-IMR FILE IND MATT rejects MATT Report Request MATT 
M-IMR FIELD MATT rejects MATT Report Request MATT 
M-IMR EXEC FAIL MATT rejects MATT Report Request MATT 
M-ADF USER ID MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request MATT 
M-ADF STATE MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request MATT 
M-ADF NO GLF MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request MATT 
M-ADB USER ID MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request MATT 
M-ADB STATE MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request MATT 
M-CID NOT SPMGR  MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List 
Request 
MATT 
M-CID USER ID  MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List 
Request 
MATT 
M-CID CI LIST  MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List 
Request 
MATT 
M-CID NOT FOUND  MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List 
Request 
MATT 
M-CIF NOT SPMGR MATT rejects Correlation Index Filter List Request  MATT 
M-CIF CI LIST MATT rejects Correlation Index Filter List Request  MATT 
M-ADR NOT SPMGR MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request MATT 
M-ADR RCVR ID MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request MATT 
M-ADR STATE MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request MATT 
M-ADR CMD FAIL MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request MATT 
M-ADR LOOP FAIL MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request MATT 
M-RLC NOT SPMGR MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request MATT 
M-RLC RCVR ID MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request MATT 
M-RLC REC NAME MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request MATT 
M-RCP NOT SPMGR MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request MATT 
M-RCP RCVR ID MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request MATT 
M-RCP COMSEC MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request MATT 
M-RCP RCVR DATA MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request MATT 
M-RCP MODE DATA MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request MATT 
M-SID NOT SPMGR MATT rejects Symbol ID Filter Request MATT 
M-SID DEVICE MATT rejects Symbol ID Filter Request MATT 
NAV MODE CHG Navigation Mode has changed or CMC has transitioned 
into or out of CMC BACKUP MODE. 
NAV 
NEW PHASE Indicates that the operator has transitioned from one 
mission phase to another. 
PHS MSN 
MRU TOP CARD FL Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU top 
card 
RECORDING 
MRU BOT CARD FL Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU 
bottom card. 
RECORDING 
CMC RESET CMC SYS STAT 
TGT TRK FULL Operator attempts to establish the 33rd target track. SYS STAT 
EEPROM CHKSM CMC EEPROM checksum does not match stored value SYS STAT 
TJSR NO NAV LR-700 has not received a Nav Data message for a 
period of time greater than 3 times the nominal Nav data 
period and has suspended tuning. 
TJSR 
TJSR SW RESET LR-700 software has reset in response to an internal 
error condition or an IM command. TJSR 
TJSR INT RESET LR-700 software has reset interfaces in response to an 
internal error condition or an IM command. 
TJSR 
TJSR AEF FULL AEF Overload. TJSR 
TJSR PGM LD FL LR-700 was unable to load an OFP from the MRU. TJSR 
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TEXT ALERT  ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
TJSR MDB FL LR-700 was unable to load an MDB file from the MRU.  TJSR 
TJSR RA REVISIT The ratio of Need to Revisit interval stays above one for 
RA sub-bands for more than one second 
TJSR 
TJSR TER LD FL LR-700 was unable to load terrain data from the MRU. TJSR 
TJSR MRU COM FL LR-700 was unable to communicate with the MRU. TJSR 
TJSR NAV INCNST Nav Data is Valid but inconsistent with previous Nav 
Data. 
TJSR 
TJSR WRAx TEMP ALQ-218 Not Warmed-Up.  This alert will be sent if the 
ALQ-218 has determined that it is sufficiently cold to not 















ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
POWER LOSS Transmitter power below threshold. Jammers 
STEERING Antenna feedback does not agree with commanded steering. Jammers 
BEAM WIDTH LIMIT Two or more jamming assignments on the same transmitter are no 






ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
PHASE CHANGE Time to change phase. Jammers 
TJSR TUNING TJSR high or low band tuning failure TJSR 
POD MISMATCH Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out. Jammers 
TDSIU TEMP TDSIU temperature above limit. TDSIU 
TJSR NO NAV No nav data available to the TJSR. TJSR 





ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
IDM An IDM degrade has been detected IDM 
IDM MSG RCV ER An error was detected when the CMC attempted to receive a message 
from IDM. 
IDM 
JAMMERS A requested jamming assignment was not made.  Excuse on the JAS 
page. 
Jammers 
MATT A MATT degrade has been detected MATT 
NAV A navigation degrade has been detected NAV 
REJECT PURGE A purge request has been rejected TJSR 
TRACKER UNAVAL CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers available. TJSR 
TDSIU A TDSIU degrade has been detected TDSIU 
MAX HARM LIST Maximum HARM lists have been reached HARM 
CAN’T ADD LIST A HARM ELINT modification was rejected HARM 
INV HARM PRI HARM PRI out of limits HARM 
INCOMP MSLBLK Operator attempted to assign a target packet with a missile block ID 
that is incompatible with the HCP selected missile. 
HARM 
LSTNG SHORTD More than 15 listings, compatible with the selected missile block, 
were available at the time of assignment to the HCP. 
HARM 
NO MSL RDY Attempt to turn on ABL mode with no MSL RDY condition. HARM 
AVOID LAUNCH Missile selected with Seeker and/or Control Section BIT failure(s). HARM 
RU B SITE ONLY Missile selected with Baro Sensor BIT failure. HARM 
MSTER RAD ON Attempt to turn on ABL with active high band jamming or activating 
jamming while ABL is on. 
HARM 
CNT MTCH FRQ Attempt to turn on ABL when no listing includes Pre-Launch 
Frequency. 
HARM 
TGTSEL FULL Attempt to create a fifth HARM TGT packet. HARM 
CHK MSL BLK  The Glide and/or Geo Spec settings that would be displayed in Zone 
5 TGTRNG are not compatible with the HCP selected missile that 
has just had a target packet assigned. 
HARM 
INAP HARM DA TJSR or operator designated best fit has changed classification of an 





ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
IDM MSG RCV ER An error was detected when the CMC attempted to receive a message 
from IDM. 
IDM 
ILLEGAL FREQ  Operator attempts a jammer assignment to Band 1, 2, or extended 
Band 7 that are not covered by the respective transmitter or the 
frequency is outside the UEU frequency limits. 
Jammers 
CANT ASG XX Operator attempts a jammer assignment and a 1553 data bus 
transmission error to station XX is detected for 3 successive data 
transmissions. 
Jammers 
CANT CLR XX Operator attempts to clear a jammer assignment to station XX and a 
1553 data bus transmission error is detected for three successive data 
transmissions. 
Jammers 
POD INTRPT X Exciter on pod station X has indicated a primary power interruption 
that results in loss of all jammer assignments in both stations of that 
exciter. 
Jammers 
JMRS ASGD XX Operator performs a Clear Files, CMC IPL or library load when 
jammer assignments exist on station XX. 
Jammers 
POD MISMATCH Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out. Jammers 
PRESS REVAL The operator attempts to change a FWS priority within the current 
mission phase or change a target track priority within the current 
mission phase or designate a target track PHASE PA eligible or 
ineligible within the current mission phase or load a library that has 
one or more PHASE PA eligible target tracks in mission phase one. 
Jammers 
ASGN IN PROG A low band adjustment is in progress. Jammers 
NO NEW JAM RQMT Jamming Assignment that will use MNB Jam Strategy but all of the 
beams are already covered by existing jamming assignment. 
Jammers 
CANNOT REASSIGN System cannot do a jammer reassign. Jammers 
INVAL JAM TECH Operator request DA with invalid jam technique. Jammers 
TTRK NOT IN USE Operator attempts a jamming assignment to a Target Track that is not 
in-use, i.e., does not exist. 
Jammers 
BND SWTCH FAULT Operator attempts to switch band of a band-switchable XMTR, and 
status is reported back as not switched. 
Jammers 
NO ASGN BFR FUL Jam assignment request results in a not-made, and there is no room in 
the not-made buffer. 
Jammers 
CM PR CL ASG The system clears jamming assignment(s) for any of several reasons. Jammers 
INAP JAMMING Operator designates a new best fit for an AEF that has current active 
AA jamming requirement. 
Jammers 






ALERTS RECOMMENDED FOR REMOVAL 
 
ALERT INDICATOR ALERT MEANING FUNCTION 
TRACKER UNAVAL CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers available. Jammers 
MRU TOP CARD FL Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU top card RECORDING 
MRU BOT CARD FL Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU bottom card. RECORDING 
CMC RESET CMC SYS STAT 
TGT TRK FULL Operator attempts to establish the 33rd target track. SYS STAT 
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